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Abstract
We analyse top income and wealth shares data, by conducting a robust estimation of 
trends, tests for structural breaks, and tests for determining persistence. We include 
Anglo-Saxon countries, continental Europe and Asian countries, grouped under dif-
ferent percentiles and deciles, spanning a period that is at least close to a century. 
We find that the top income shares for almost all countries are characterised by bro-
ken trends, or level shifts. The preponderance of trend breaks appears in the 1970s 
and 1980s where after a negative trend changes in magnitude or direction. Finally, 
shocks to the top income share data are not transitory, which have consequences for 
policy such as advocating redistributive measures.
Keywords Inequality · Top income shares · Trends · Persistence
JEL Classification C22 · C32 · N30
1 Introduction
In 1953, Simon Kuznets and Elizabeth Jenks published Shares of Upper Income 
Groups in Income and Saving, where they produced the first comparable long-run 
income distribution series. One year later, in his famous presidential address to the 
American Economic Association, Kuznets first addressed the ‘character and causes 
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of long-term changes in the personal distribution of income’ (Kuznets 1955). In his 
speech, Kuznets emphasised the need to develop proper definitions of inequality and 
outlined the properties of the data required for the study of inequality over time. 
Since then, efforts have been made to provide data on inequality. While the primary 
focus has been on building micro-panel data sets based on national household sur-
veys, the consequent lack of data spanning a long period meant that the long-run 
analysis of inequality remained under-researched.
Until recently, existing databases on inequality did not cover a long enough time 
span. Since structural changes in income and wealth distributions are relatively 
slow and very often span over several decades, it is important to analyse inequality 
measures that cover a long enough period (Piketty 2007 p.2), preferably a centu-
rial perspective or closer, in order to properly understand such changes in a broader 
historical perspective. The much called for building up a long time series data set 
on inequality was taken up by Piketty (2003) which involved constructing a series 
of top income shares for France, spanning the entire twentieth century. This led to 
a growing interest among various researchers in the long-run dynamics of inequal-
ity, and similar efforts of constructing data sets spanning long periods for many 
other countries. The data on top income shares has been employed in many studies 
to draw attention to the rich and their income levels by uncovering the top income 
distributions. This approach contributes to the set of studies that have focussed on 
top income distributions rather than the overall measures of inequality such as the 
Gini. As pointed out by Roine and Waldenström (2015), top income shares are not 
just about the rich and, in the absence of available alternatives, they provide a useful 
general measure of inequality over time, even if they say nothing meaningful about 
the changes happening within the lower part of the income distribution.
There have been calls for exploiting the dynamics of long-run inequality data 
over time, paying attention to the variation of countries, using econometric meth-
ods to determine whether structural breaks are present in the trend, as well as the 
underlying signs and magnitudes of trend (or no trend) in the regimes demar-
cated by the breaks. To our knowledge, Roine and Waldenström (2011) make the 
first attempt of analysing breaks and trends in the data of top income shares of 
eighteen countries. Their research aims to identify common breaks and estimate 
breaking trends among countries and groups of countries, such as Nordic, Anglo-
Saxon, Continental Europe and Asia. While their study is highly insightful, there 
are two limitations of their study. First, the inequality data is assumed to be sta-
tionary in their econometric analysis. We do not find any support for this assump-
tion, rather on the contrary, inequality measures are found to be nonstationary 
integrated processes; therefore, not accounting for this property of the time series 
data on inequality can lead to inaccurate trend estimation. To be specific, if the 
data series is integrated of order one (which implies that the data series would 
need to be first differenced to achieve stationarity) then standard methods of least 
squares to estimate and test the significance of the trend will suffer from severe 
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size distortions (see Ghoshray et  al. 2014).1 We choose to employ a range of 
robust procedures that allow us to be agnostic to the order of integration of the 
data. Secondly, another drawback is the choice of too many breaks, especially 
in small samples from 1950 onwards. The maximum number of breaks must be 
chosen according to the sample size so that sufficient observations are in each 
sub-sample (Kejriwal and Perron 2010, p. 320). Besides, a unit root process can 
be viewed as a limiting case of a stationary process with multiple breaks, one that 
has a break (permanent shock) every period. Sequential procedures for detect-
ing trend breaks will be based on successively smaller data subsamples (as more 
breaks are allowed) thereby leading to low power and/or size distortions (see 
Kejriwal and Perron 2010). We select the maximum number of breaks in accord-
ance with the recommendations by Kejriwal and Perron (2010) which have also 
been followed in empirical studies by Harvey et  al. (2013) and Ghoshray et  al. 
(2014).
As these methodological issues are crucial for correctly specified trend esti-
mates and persistence measures, we elaborate on these points. Past studies that 
have estimated trends had to conduct unit root tests to determine whether the data 
series can be characterised as trend stationary or difference stationary. This is 
because Perron (1988) noted that the correct specification of the trend function 
is important in the context of testing for a unit root in the data. For example, if 
the data contains a unit root, then the standard method of least squares to test for 
the presence of a trend would suffer from severe size distortions. Or, if the data is 
mistakenly considered to contain a unit root when in fact the data is trend station-
ary, the tests will be inefficient and will lack power relative to the trend stationary 
process (see Perron and Yabu 2009b). The situation is further complicated if one 
entertains the possibility of structural breaks in the data series. It is well known 
that we are likely to under-reject the unit root null if we neglect structural breaks 
in a trend stationary process (Perron 1989). Alternatively, a neglected trend break 
in a data series that contains a unit root can lead standard unit root tests to incor-
rectly suggest the presence of stationarity (Leybourne et al. 1998). While recent 
studies allow for structural breaks in unit processes, what is not clear at the onset 
is whether structural breaks are at all present in the data. A problem with the 
application of these unit root tests is that they provide little information regard-
ing the existence and number of trend breaks as well as whether the breaks are 
pure level shifts or affect both the level and slope of the trend function. Besides, 
when testing for a structural break, we have no knowledge of the order of integra-
tion of the data. Inference based on a test for structural breaks on the data series 
depends on whether a unit root is present, while tests based on differenced data 
can have very poor properties when the series contains a stationary component 
(Vogelsang 1998). This circular testing problem makes it imperative to employ 
robust procedures that allow us to be agnostic to the form of serial correlation in 
1 Roine and Waldenstrom (2011) apply methods due to Bai and Perron (2003) and Qu and Perron (2007) 
that require the data to be trend stationary and our subsequent tests find to the contrary, that the data is 
integrated of order one.
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the data. Accordingly, we adopt robust procedures to estimate trend breaks (e.g., 
the procedure due to Perron and Yabu (2009a; Kejriwal and Perron 2010; Harvey 
et al. 2009), as well as pure level breaks (due to Harvey et al. 2010), and trend 
estimates (due to Perron and Yabu 2009b).
Besides estimating structural breaks and breaking trends, we examine whether 
shocks to top income shares are persistent or not. To the best of our knowledge, 
this has not been explicitly investigated in past studies, and we thereby make a 
contribution to the literature.. We motivate our use of methods by taking an intui-
tive approach, by determining if structural breaks are at all present in the data 
before proceeding to conduct unit root tests that allow for such breaks. The rea-
son is that standard tests suffer from low power due to the inclusion of extraneous 
break dummies. This leads to the possible estimation of a differenced specifica-
tion when a level specification may be more appropriate. Campbell and Perron 
(1991) argue that the proper specification of the deterministic components is 
essential to obtaining unit root tests with reliable finite sample properties. Sec-
ondly, the standard unit root tests suffer from serious power and size distortions 
when structural breaks are included only under the null or only under the alter-
native hypotheses (see Ghoshray et al. 2014). Given that we find overwhelming 
evidence in favour of structural breaks in the data, we apply a set of unit root tests 
that allows for breaks in the level and the slope under both the null and alterna-
tive hypotheses developed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009). Such a symmetric 
treatment of breaks alleviates the size and power problems that affect most of 
the standard structural break unit root tests, such as the tests due to Zivot and 
Andrews (1992), and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997). For the single case where we 
find no instability either in the level or in the slope, we apply standard (no break) 
unit root tests developed by Elliott et al. (1996) and Ng and Perron (2001).
This paper provides a comprehensive univariate time series analysis of top 
income and wealth shares data. This involves a robust estimation of trends, tests 
for structural breaks, and determining persistence in top income and wealth 
shares for twelve countries, which include Anglo-Saxon countries, continental 
Europe and Asian countries. We choose data that spans a period that is at least 
close to a century to allow for the potential presence of structural breaks. The 
measures of inequality include top income and wealth shares. We analyse the top 
0.1%, 1% and 10% of the income distribution, and the top 1% and 10% of the 
wealth distribution. The analysis of breaks, trends, and persistence in the data is 
carried out separately for each individual time series. We make an empirical con-
tribution to the literature by addressing the dynamics of inequality of income and 
wealth over time using suitable and robust econometric procedures. Accordingly, 
we set out the following set of hypotheses to be tested:
Hypothesis I Do top income/wealth share data exhibit broken trends? Here we 
want to determine whether we can detect structural breaks at what has been observed 
in past studies as turning points, that allow us to demarcate two or three regimes: 
prior to Great Depression or World War II, following from this point of time up to 
the 1980s; and then the period thereafter.
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Hypothesis II Is their evidence of top income/wealth shares following a U-shape 
or L-shape trend? In other words, whether the trend of top income shares was high 
prior to the Great Depression, then decrease between World War II and the mid-
1970s, and since then increase again or flatten out (Atkinson et  al. 2011). These 
regimes may coincide with the start of assembly lines (early part of the twentieth 
century) the high rates of marginal taxation from post war period to the late 1970s, 
followed by the drastic cuts to the top rates of taxes, a surge in incomes, as well as 
deregulation of the financial sector.
Hypothesis III Allowing for these structural changes if they exist, do we find evi-
dence of persistent inequality? If shocks to inequality are not transitory, then exoge-
nous shocks, such as technological innovations or financial shocks, are likely to have 
persistent effects, which have consequences for policy such as advocating redistribu-
tive measures (Christopoulos and McAdam 2017). Alternatively, if shocks to ine-
quality are transitory, then it implies that opportunities exist for distributional mobil-
ity that allow income shares to be brought towards a constant level in the long run 
(Islam and Madsen; 2015). It has been argued that since the 1980s, inequality has 
been extreme and persistent. Is there an argument that countries which never were 
directly involved in the war have not been inclined to impose a post-war Egalitarian 
regime? Is it the case that as a result, the top income shares have been persistent?
To answer these questions, we make use of methods that are robust and allow us 
to be agnostic of the underlying order of integration of the data. These robust meth-
ods, to our knowledge, have not been applied to top income share data. In our analy-
sis, we provide confidence intervals to determine whether the trends are significant. 
To this end, we first check to see whether there are trend breaks, in which case the 
trend estimation is broken which leads to either the magnitude and/or the sign of the 
trend to change with time. The contribution is therefore empirical, as we are provid-
ing robust estimations of trend and persistence in the top income and wealth shares 
data.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section  2 provides a review of 
the literature. Section  3 explains the econometric methodology used to test these 
hypotheses. Section 4 reports the empirical results. The final section concludes.
2  Literature review
Piketty (2003) documents that for France, inequality increased from the beginning 
of the twentieth century to World War I, after which it decreased until the late 1970s, 
and then the trend started to rise again. This study has proven to be highly influen-
tial, prompting a range of studies investigating the trends in top income shares in 
other countries such as UK (Atkinson 2005), USA (Piketty and Saez 2003), Canada 
(Saez and Veall 2005), continental Europe and the developed countries (Atkinson 
and Piketty 2007), Australia (Atkinson and Leigh 2007), Japan (Moriguchi and Saez 
2010) and India (Chancel and Piketty 2019). In general, the studies find that the 
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measures of inequality have differing trends depending on the period of time and 
the associated underlying economic conditions. For example, the causes for decline 
in top income shares over the first half of the twentieth century have been attrib-
uted to the loss of large amounts of wealth to capital owners caused by exogenous 
shocks, thereby decreasing their income share (Roine et al. 2009). This decline in 
wealth continued to fall decades after World War II due to high taxes. However, 
after 1980 it has been argued that that top income shares have increased in Anglo-
Saxon countries but not in Continental European countries (Roine et al. 2009), and 
this has not been due to increases in capital incomes but rather due to increased 
wage inequality (Piketty et al. 2014). For example, Piketty et al. (2014) argue that 
when top rates of taxes were cut, this may have led to chief executives negotiating 
harder for higher remuneration and bonuses. Atkinson and Piketty (2007) argue that 
the top 1% income shares in European and English-speaking countries maintained 
a relatively high level up until World War I. This was followed by a drop that took 
place during World War II and the Great Depression, although the fall in top income 
shares was more gradual for those countries that stayed out of World War II. From 
then on, the top income share declined steadily over the twentieth century up until 
around 1980, when it began to increase again. According to Atkinson et al. (2011), 
Anglo-Saxon countries (such as Australia, New Zealand, USA) have experienced a 
substantially greater increase than non-English speaking countries (such as France, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands).
Despite the strong emphasis in the top income share literature on the diverging 
patterns between Anglo-Saxon countries and continental Europe, recent studies cov-
ering many other countries have provided deeper insights into the long-run evolution 
of inequality. Atkinson and Piketty (2010) and Atkinson et al. (2011) provide evi-
dence on inequality trends across six different groups of countries, namely Anglo-
Saxon, continental Europe, Nordic, Asian, African and Latin American countries. 
According to Roine and Waldenström (2015), almost all countries, which include 
Nordic, Anglo Saxon and Asian, exhibit a secular decline in top income shares over 
the twentieth century. These recent studies conclude that divergences within country 
groups appear from around the 1980s onwards, with substantial increases for the 
Western English-speaking countries as well as China and India; a modest increase 
in some Nordic countries and Southern European countries; and no increase or 
decrease in some Continental European countries and Japan. These results suggest 
that Kuznet’s proposal that inequality follows an inverted U-shape2 does not apply to 
all countries.
The literature on inequality has proposed several theories aimed at explaining 
the trends and structural breaks present in inequality data over the last century. For 
example, Murphy (1999) and Krueger (2012) suggest skill-biased technological 
2 In this paper, we refer to the following shapes as suggested by Atkinson et al. (2011) which we define 
by structural breaks and corresponding regimes. For example, (1) a U-shape refers to a process character-
ised by two structural breaks, and therefore three regimes starting with a negative trend, then zero trend 
and positive trend; (2) an L-shape characterised by a single break and two regimes with a negative trend 
followed by a zero trend. We further allow for a (3) V-shape which refers to a process characterised by 
one structural break, and therefore two regimes comprising a negative trend followed by a positive trend.
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change as one of the main factors. According to the proponents of this theory, in the 
absence of a growing supply of skilled workers, technological change will increase 
the wage difference between skilled and unskilled workers. However, Atkinson 
(2008) argues that if countries are affected by the same technological change, the 
impact on wages will depend on the ability of each country to supply workers with 
higher skills, and therefore, skill-biased technological change does not automati-
cally lead to wage differences and higher inequality. Further, Caselli (1999) points 
out that not all technological changes are in fact skill-biased. Instead, some techno-
logical changes may have boosted the productivity of low-skilled workers (Mokyr 
1990). Roine et al. (2009) mention the role that political climate can play on ine-
quality. Distinctions are drawn between Anglo-Saxon countries which tend to be lib-
eral welfare states, as opposed to continental European countries that are corporat-
ist-conservative, which is again in contrast with Scandinavian countries which are 
social democratic welfare states. Also, as an example, top income shares in the USA 
and UK increased due to the tax breaks offered by Reagan and Thatcher implying 
political regimes can matter. Piketty (2003) devotes space in his study about the role 
of progressive taxation on the evolving dynamics of top income shares in the case 
of France. The role of tax progressivity is also analysed by Roine and Waldenström 
(2008) in the case of Sweden. Saez and Veall (2005) analyse the drop of marginal 
rates of taxation in the 1960s on Canada. They conclude that the increase in top 
income shares for Canada is more to do with the similar factors affecting the USA, 
rather than tax progressivity. For Canada, two studies by Saez and Veall (2005, 
2007) conclude the top income shares surged in the last two decades of the twen-
tieth century, and further evidence was found by Murphy et  al. (2007) and Veall 
(2010). In another study, examining the estimates from a new set of taxfiler data, 
Veall (2012) notices that the rapid increase in top income shares in Canada was not 
smooth after 2000, rather variations were noted. Jäntti et al. (2010) conclude that the 
increase in top income shares in Finland has been a result of lowering the progres-
sivity of income tax. It can be noted in the study by Chancel and Piketty (2019) that 
the increase in top income shares of India coincide with the decrease of top rates of 
income tax from 62 to 50% in the early 1980s. Regarding the role of globalisation in 
explaining inequality, the findings in the literature are polarised. While some authors 
conclude that globalisation accentuates inequality (Firebaugh 2003; Wade 2004), 
others suggest that economic integration has played an important role in closing 
the inequality gap (Dollar and Kraay 2002). Globalisation, along with information 
technology, may also play an important role in explaining the increasing wage dis-
persion observed for “stars” in certain professions (Rosen 1981). The link between 
inequality and growth has been studied in both the theoretical and the empirical lit-
erature, with conflicting results. Growth in per capita GDP has been associated with 
increases in top income shares (Roine et al. 2009).
While there has been a continuously evolving discussion of the time-varying 
nature of inequality for various developed countries, the econometric analysis is 
limited. This may be due to the fact that the income distribution data is relatively 
new (Atkinson and Leigh 2013). One of the few econometric applications on time 
series data pertaining to inequality is that of Roine and Waldenström (2011), where 
they apply multiple structural change tests within a single equation framework as 
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proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), and a system of equations framework fol-
lowing the recent methodology developed by Qu and Perron (2007). The empirical 
analysis of Roine and Waldenström (2011) attempts to test for and identify com-
mon breaks in the data of top income shares of eighteen countries using two sepa-
rate time series data sets; one that covers a sample spanning almost a century and 
another that focusses on the post war period. As discussed earlier, the drawback is 
that their study assumes the top income share data to be stationary, and the choice of 
too many breaks in a small data sample. These issues lead to misspecified results as 
explained in the previous section.
Besides income inequality, research in to wealth inequality has been gaining 
importance especially since publication of the book Capital in the Twenty First Cen-
tury by Piketty (2014) where the main driver of inequality has been the tendency 
of capital returns to exceed the rate of economic growth. Kopczuk (2015) uses sur-
vey based and estate tax methods to conclude that top 1% wealth share of the USA 
increased at a modest rate. Saez and Zucman (2016) estimate wealth inequality using 
capitalisation methods and find that the top 1% and top 10% wealth shares were high 
in the USA in the early part of the twentieth century and then have been decreasing 
up to the late 1970s before increasing again. Alvaredo et al. (2018) find that the top 
wealth shares for the UK were relatively constant from 1895 to 1914, and then have 
decreased sharply until 1979. Since then, the wealth shares have started to rise. In a 
more recent study, Zucman (2019) notes that the top shares of wealth inequality for 
France and UK show a similar path which may be due to nationalisations, rent con-
trols and taxation during the 1950s to the 1970s. In recent decades, Zucman (2019) 
notes that the wealth inequality for France and the UK has been rising at a slower 
rate than the USA. He notes that the wealth inequality for both top 1% and top 10% 
is close to what they were a century ago, whereas for France and UK the wealth 
inequality levels are still much lower than what they were in the early 1900s. While 
these seminal studies have made a significant contribution by developing methods 
to construct the time series of top wealth shares, the commentary of the trends of 
these inequality measures is based on visual inspection and not robust econometric 
methods.
A recent study by Islam and Madsen (2015) tests whether income inequality 
is persistent by employing a long panel data set of Gini coefficients and top 10% 
income shares for 21 OECD countries over the period 1870–2011. They employ the 
individual and panel stationary tests due to Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) allowing 
for a maximum of five structural breaks. The test is based on the Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992) (KPSS) test. They compute the bootstrap distribution following Maddala and 
Wu (1999) with 10,000 replications to take account of cross-sectional dependence in 
the estimates of the KPSS test statistics, in order to reduce the bias and increase the 
power of the tests. As a robustness test, they employ the Bai and Carrion-i-Silves-
tre (2009) panel unit root tests that allow for multiple structural breaks. Their study 
concludes that the shocks to income inequality are temporary. The methods applied 
are comprehensive and show that there are mechanisms that bring income shares 
to a constant level. However, in another more recent and comparable study, Chris-
topoulos and McAdam (2017) examine inequality persistence in a multi-country 
unbalanced panel using a range of stationary and long memory tests. They analyse 
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the Gini index for 47 countries spanning a time period of at least 30 years. The tests 
employed include panel unit roots with and without breaks. The test for unit roots 
with breaks is based on a novel procedure that allows for a Fourier function. Finally 
a panel fractional unit root test is also conducted. Conducting these tests, they find 
no evidence of shocks being transitory to inequality measures. The results of Chris-
topoulos and McAdam (2017) contradict those of Islam and Madsen (2015).
3  Econometric methodology
As described earlier, the circular testing problem underscores the need to employ 
break testing procedures that do not require knowledge of the form of serial correla-
tion in the data. Based on those arguments, we choose to estimate the trend function 
based on the general model given by:


















 , where i ≠ 0 , and i is the break fraction. The date(s) for any 
break(s) in the series and the number of breaks (K) are unknown. No assumptions 
are made with regard to the nature of the error term, i.e.ut can be eitherI(0) , that 
is,|𝜌| < 1 , or I(1) that is, = 1 . To determine whether structural breaks exist, we test 
the null hypothesis H0 ∶ i = 0 against the alternativeH1 ∶ i ≠ 0 . Perron and Yabu 
(2009a) propose a robust method to detect a break in the trend function based on 
a Feasible Quasi Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method and a further second 
break using a sequential approach due to Kejriwal and Perron (2010).
We first test for a single structural break in the slope of the trend function using 
the robust procedure of Perron and Yabu (2009a). A rejection of null hypothesis of no 
break by this robust test is evidence in favour of a break, whereupon we then proceed 
to test for one against two slope breaks using the sequential approach of Kejriwal 
and Perron (2010). Again, this latter test allows us to distinguish between one and 
two breaks while being agnostic to whether a unit root is present. Given the number 
of sample observations available to be approximately 100, we allow for a maximum 
of two breaks in our empirical analysis. There are two reasons for this. As we have 
explained earlier, we expect according to the observations made by Atkinson et al. 
(2011) that there may be two breaks to account for the U-shape trend in top income 
shares data. Secondly, as discussed earlier, from an econometric viewpoint allowing 
for a large number of breaks is not an appropriate strategy (see Harvey et al. 2013; 
Ghoshray et al. 2014).
To briefly describe the Perron and Yabu (2009a) procedure, the following autore-
gression on the error term in (1) is estimated:
(1)






iDTit + ut, t = 1, 2,… ,T
ut = ut−1 + t, t = 2, 3,… , T , u1 = 1
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where the lag length k is chosen using the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). The 
estimate of  is obtained using OLS, denoted ?̃? . Perron and Yabu (2009a) use a bias 
corrected version of ?̃? , denoted by ?̃?M , to improve the finite sample properties of the 
tests, proposed by Roy and Fuller (2001). In the next step, Perron and Yabu (2009a) 
calculate the super-efficient estimator of  given by:
Using a super-efficient estimate is crucial for obtaining nearly identical limit 
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 is an 
estimate of 2 times the spectral density function of vt = (1 − L)ut at frequency 
zero. If ̃|𝛼MS| < 1 , a kernel-based estimator given by









 is the quadratic spectral kernel and l̃ is the bandwidth. When ?̃?MS = 1 , the esti-
mate suggested is an autoregressive spectral density estimate that can be obtained 
from the regression:
where the lag length k is again chosen using the BIC. Following Andrews (1993) 
and Andrews and Ploberger (1994), Perron and Yabu (2009a) consider the Mean, 
Exp, and sup functionals of the Wald test for different break dates. They found that 
with the Exp functional, the limit distribution in the I(0) and I(1) cases is nearly 
identical. They recommend the following statistic to determine the structural break:
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A further robust test to detect structural breaks due to Harvey et  al. (2009) is 
applied. This is a t statistic which allows us to test for a structural break allowing us 
to be agnostic to the underlying order of integration of the data. The statistic is con-
structed as a weighted average of the regression t-statistic for a broken trend from a 
regression in levels and in first differences (see Harvey et al. 2009) for details. The 
statistic is given by:
















 are auxiliary statistics. 








→ 1 when the 
error term in the trend function is I(0), and → 0 , when I(1).
In the spirit of Perron and Yabu (2009a), Kejriwal and Perron (2010) propose 
a sequential procedure that allows one to obtain a consistent estimate of the true 
number of breaks irrespective of whether the errors are I(1) or I(0). The first step is 
to conduct a test for no break versus one break. Conditional on a rejection, the esti-
mated break date is obtained by a global minimisation of the sum of squared residu-
als. The strategy proceeds by testing each of the two segments (obtained using the 
estimated partition) for the presence of an additional break and assessing whether 
the maximum of the tests is significant. Formally, the test of one versus two breaks 
is expressed as:
where ExpW (i) is the one break test in segment i . We conclude in favour of a model 
with two breaks if ExpW(2|1) is sufficiently large.
We make a further test for pure level shifts due to Harvey et al. (2010) that allows 
us to be agnostic of the order of integration of the data series. Conditional on the 
presence of a stable slope (that is, setting i = 0 in (1)) we set up the null hypothesis 
H0 ∶ i = 0 against the alternative H1 ∶ i ≠ 0 . Specifically, we consider the union 





 denote the  significance level asymptotic critical values of S1 
under I(1) errors and S0 under I(0) errors, respectively; and  is a positive scaling 
constant. The statistics S1 and S1 are constructed using the long-run variances from 
I(1) and I(0) errors, respectively (see Harvey et al. 2010).
In the second stage of the empirical analysis, we conduct robust estimations of 
the trend. If no structural breaks in the trend are found to be present in the data, 
then we estimate the trend function for the entire sample. In the cases where we 
obtain pure level breaks holding the trend constant, the significance of the trend 
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the data; otherwise, a level specification is used if there is no unit root. However, 
if trend breaks are found to be present in the data, we delineate the sub-samples 
from the break points and conduct robust trend estimation for each of the regimes 
demarcated by the break points. To this end, we apply an appropriate econometric 
method of robust trend estimation due to Perron and Yabu (2009b) that allows 
one to be agnostic to the nature of persistence of errors in the trend function.
Following this procedure, the residuals ût in (2) are obtained from a regression 
of yt on xt = (1, t)� . The super-efficient estimate ?̃?MS (obtained as discussed ear-





� . We denote the estimate of 0 from this regression by 
















1 − ?̃?MS, t − ?̃?MS(t − 1)
]
 for t = 2,3,… , T  , a 100(1 − )% confidence interval 
for 0 ; again valid for both I(1) and I(0) errors, is obtained as




= 𝛼∕2 for x ∼ N(0,1) and h̃v is already defined.
In the final stage of empirical analysis, we conduct unit root tests to determine 
whether shocks to the top income and wealth shares data are transitory or not. If 
there is evidence of structural breaks, we apply a class of unit root tests which 
allows for breaks under both the null and alternative hypotheses (Carrion-i-Sil-
vestre et al. 2009). The tests are extensions of the feasible point optimal statistic 
of Elliott et al. (1996) and the M class of tests due to Ng and Perron (2001).
Consider Eq.  (1); the estimates of the break fractions i and the regression 
parameters are obtained by minimising the sum of squared residuals from the 
quasi-differenced regression analogous to (4). The sum of squared residuals eval-
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The feasible point optimal statistic calculated by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) 
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Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) also consider extensions of the M-class of tests 
developed by Ng and Perron (2001). These extensions involve the inclusion of 
multiple structural breaks, building on the work of Perron and Rodriguez (2003). 
The statistics computed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) are similar to Ng and 
Perron (2001) where the null hypothesis is that of a unit root against the alterna-
tive of stationarity with the symmetric treatment of structural breaks in the null 









 have already been defined. The computation of the critical 
values of these powerful unit root tests is described by Carrion-i-Silvestre et  al. 
(2009).
Such a symmetric treatment of breaks alleviates these unit root tests from size 
and power problems that plague tests based on search procedures (for instance, 
Zivot and Andrews 1992; Lumsdaine and Papell 1997). If no evidence is found for 
structural breaks, we apply standard (no break) unit root tests developed by Elliott 
et  al. (1996) and Ng and Perron (2001). There is always a potential power issue 
associated with unit root tests allowing for multiple breaks, given that a unit root 
process is observationally equivalent to a stationary process with multiple breaks in 
the limit. Simulation evidence presented in Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) shows 
that the tests allowing up to two breaks have decent finite sample power when the 
data generating process is driven by one or two breaks. Indeed, they have much bet-
ter properties than unit root tests based on search procedures given that they exploit 
information regarding the presence of breaks.
4  Data and empirical results
To conduct the robust econometric procedures, it is imperative that we analyse data 
sets that are continuously available over a long period of time. We only employ data 
that covers a time period that is at least close to a century. In an effort to analyse as 
many countries as possible, we make use of time series data on top income shares 
from various sources. Data on the top 0.1% income shares for Australia, Canada, 
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for India from Chancel and Piketty (2019). The top 1% income shares for Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, USA, Japan, India and France are from the World Income 
Database (WID) and for Sweden, Norway, Finland and Netherlands we use the data 
made available by Daniel Waldenstrom.3 Since the focus is to exploit the maximum 
length of data that is available, we analyse data sets that cover different lengths of 
time. For the top 10% income shares as well as the top 1% and 10% wealth shares 
for USA and France we obtain data from the WID. In all these categories long time 
Table 1  Data description
Countries Data period Source
Top 0.1% income share
Australia 1921–2010 Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018)
Canada 1920–2010 Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018)
USA 1913–2012 Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018)
Japan 1886–2010 Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018)
India 1922–2014 Chancel and Piketty (2019)
France 1915–2013 Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018)
Top 1% income share
Australia 1919–2016 World Income Database
Canada 1920–2010 World Income Database
New Zealand 1921–2016 World Income Database
USA 1913–2014 World Income Database
Japan 1886–2010 World Income Database
India 1922–2015 World Income Database
France 1915–2017 World Income Database
Sweden 1920–2004 Waldenstrom webpage
Norway 1920–2004 Waldenstrom webpage
Finland 1920–2004 Waldenstrom webpage
Netherlands 1920–2004 Waldenstrom webpage
Top 10% income share
USA 1913–2014 World Income Database
France 1915–2017 World Income Database
Top 1% wealth share
USA 1913–2014 World Income Database
France 1902–2014 World Income Database
UK 1895–2003 Alvaredo et al. (2018)
Top 10% wealth share
USA 1913–2014 World Income Database
France 1902–2014 World Income Database
UK 1895–2003 Alvaredo et al. (2018)
3 see: http:// www. uueco nomics. se/ danie lw/ Data. htm. We thank Prof. Waldenstrom for sharing the data.
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(near a century long) series data is only available for USA and France. We found 
top 1% and 10% wealth share data for the UK from Alvaredo et al. (2018).4 A brief 
summary of the time span and source of all the data used in this study is shown in 
Table 1.
The top income shares data used by Roine and Waldenström (2011) is the per-
sonal income tax returns on the national level. Income shares are calculated fol-
lowing a methodology first outlined in Piketty (2003) which builds on the work by 
Kuznets and Jenks (1953). Top income shares are constructed by dividing the num-
ber of top share tax units and their incomes, with the reference tax population and 
their total income. The income is gross total income before taxes and transfers (see 
Roine and Waldenström 2011 for details).5
Further, the WID puts forward a disclaimer that their methods to generate the 
top income and wealth share data are likely to be imperfect, and subject to revi-
sion. This is based on an ongoing process where researchers affiliated to the WID 
combine available fiscal, survey and national accounts data. The methods over time 
have become more systematic, but as they acknowledge, this is still work in pro-
gress. It has been noted in studies by Burkhauser et al. (2012), Bricker et al. (2016), 
that different results in terms of magnitude of changes can be obtained using data 
from tax records as opposed to data from surveys. Problems with the data from sur-
veys as highlighted by Burkhauser et al. (2012) are that there are problems with the 
coverage of the survey, sampling issues, and under-reporting. Besides, the informa-
tion collected from survey units might not capture the responses accurately, or in 
other words there arises a measurement or processing error (Bricker et al. 2016). 
Also, there is the problem with fiscal manipulation as highlighted by Burkhauser 
et al. (2012) where high-income earners are able to adjust their incomes in a way 
so that they pay less tax. While Piketty and Saez (2003) state this is not a problem 
when testing long-term trends, it is still not free from criticism of the extent to which 
income is reported and can still lead to inaccurate measurements of inequality. 
Accordingly, the WID and other researchers attempt to compute top income shares 
series using income tax data, national accounts, and Pareto interpolation techniques 
to estimate the share of total income going to top income and wealth groups. While 
these techniques are not fully homogeneous over time and across countries, this is 
the only data available to analyse long-run trends in top income and wealth shares. 
For the length of time we consider, we are limited to restricting our attention to the 
top decile, and top percentile.
Some of the sources as we can see from Table 1 can differ and the measures may 
differ slightly from each other. However, there should be no issues regarding the 
analysis we conduct as it is univariate in nature. We are not analysing how the dif-
ferent inequality shares relate to one another, but simply how trends in inequality are 
5 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, some caution needs to be exercised when using the century 
long data. National accounts for the countries considered in this study only came in to being from the 
1950s onwards, which implies that the construction of the top income shares which depends on GDP 
data is unlikely to be precisely accounted for. We gratefully acknowledge this point.
4 There were some missing observations which we addressed using linear interpolation.
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evolving over a long enough period of time. In this study we aim to focus on those 
countries for which we have data that is close to if not more than a century long. The 
long time span covered allows for interpretation of some historical developments, in 
particular whether long-run trends can be fitted to the data, and whether exogenous 
shocks to the top income shares have had a transitory effect on inequality.
Hypothesis I Do top income/ wealth share data exhibit broken trends?
Table 2  Structural break tests
*** ,**,and *denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The number of breaks is 
determined by statistical significance of rejecting the null of either no slope break or no level shift




U # of breaks Break date(s)
Top 0.1% income shares
Australia 24.29*** 0.43 5.88*** 1 1986
Canada 1.67* 10.30*** 3.54** 2 1933, 1971
USA 4.58**  − 0.09 8.96*** 1 1970
Japan 0.35 1.57 0.91*** 1 1944
India 1.58* 1.34 3.40** 1 1977
France 1.24* 4.62** 3.48** 2 1948, 1982
Top 1% income shares
Australia 0.76 N/A 3.99* 1 1973
Canada 0.70 N/A 2.39 0.72** 1 1941
New Zealand 0.38 N/A 2.71 0.58* 1 1999
USA 27.49***  − 0.14 6.02*** 1 1973
Japan  − 0.11 N/A 1.30 0.68** 1 1944
India 0.54 N/A 3.88* 1 1978
France 0.67 N/A 2.29 0.60* 1 1945
Sweden 4.87** 20.21*** 4.23** 2 1971, 1983
Norway 14.73*** 0.43 5.96*** 1 1988
Finland 2.81** 2.61** 2.97 2 1973,1986
Netherlands 0.05 1.68 0.49 0
Top 10% income shares
USA 0.94 N/A 2.19 0.94*** 1 1941
France 0.37 N/A 2.23 0.57* 1 1945
Top 1% wealth shares
USA 1.64*  − 0.16 2.98* 1 1975
France 0.74 N/A 2.43 0.66* 1 1995
UK 4.60** 90.64*** 2 1950, 1986
Top 10% wealth shares
USA 1.12 N/A 3.32** 1 1982
France 0.46 N/A 2.13 0.77** 1 1967
UK 16.25*** 130.48*** 2 1950, 1986
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We test for the presence of a single structural break using the procedure by Perron 
and Yabu (2009a) and the sequential procedure of detecting two breaks due to Kejri-
wal and Perron (2010). The null hypothesis is that the data series does not contain 
a break against the alternative of a single break (i.e. Exp(0|1)). If we find a single 
break, we then proceed to test the null hypothesis of a single break against the alter-
native of two breaks (i.e., Exp(1|2)). We also apply the robust test of Harvey et al. 
(2009) which is the t test. If either of tests does not reject the no break null, we then 
proceed to test for a pure level shift, based on the U test due to Harvey et al. (2010) 
where the null hypothesis is of no level breaks. Table 2 reports the test results for 
both slope breaks and level breaks, and if structural breaks are present, the loca-
tion of the break (i.e., the break date(s)). The results for the top 0.1%, 1% and 10% 
income shares, as well as the top 1% and 10% wealth shares, are given in Table 2.
Using a comprehensive set of robust trend break tests, we find for the top 0.1 
percentile income shares, there are two trend breaks for Canada and France, whereas 
we find a single trend break for USA, India and Australia. These results are cor-
roborated by the t test. We do not find a trend break for Japan, so we apply the level 
break U test instead, and find evidence of a pure level shift. The location of the break 
dates is mostly around the 1970s and 1980s. The level shift in the case of Japan 
occurs at 1944, which is supported by Moriguchi and Saez (2010) where they note 
that World War II had a significant impact on Japan and attribute the sharp drop in 
top income shares during World War II and thereafter to redistributive policies.
When considering the top 1 percent income shares, we find six countries to 
contain at least two trend breaks. Most of the trend break locations are around the 
1970s. Level shifts are found for Canada, New Zealand, Japan and France. Except 
for New Zealand,6 the break date locations are in the 1940s. The results for France 
are supported by Piketty (2005) where he notes that the sharp drop in top income 
shares is mainly due to the fall in capital incomes as top wage shares did not fall 
during this period. The shocks due to the Great Depression and wars led to capital 
owners incurring severe losses. Piketty (2005) goes on to argue that the shocks to 
top income shares in the 1940s had a permanent effect due to the introduction of 
income and estate taxes. In the case of India, our estimate of the trend break is at 
1977–1978 for both top 0.1% and top 1% income shares and this coincides well with 
the sharp drops in the rates of tax progressivity, where substantial cuts were made 
to the top rates of marginal taxation which were quite high. This clarifies the visual 
inspection of the data made by Chancel and Piketty (2019) where they observe the 
turning point to be 1983–1984. Out of the 25 different combinations of countries 
and the associated top shares of income and wealth chosen, we find that there are 
trend breaks in 15 of the data series. Six of these show two significant trend breaks 
and the remaining nine show a single break. At least one of these trend breaks is 
around the 1970s or 1980s. The preponderance of trend breaks around this period 
6 A caveat to note about the top income share data is the level shift that we find in the case of New Zea-
land in 1999. By construction, the top income share data can be affected by legislation which occurred 
for New Zealand when the marginal rate of tax was raised in the year 2000 (Atkinson and Leigh 2007). 
We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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fits in with the argument put forward in various studies that the top marginal rates of 
taxes were reduced in varying degrees approximately around this period (Alvaredo 
et al. 2013; Piketty et al. 2014), as well as the surge in top wage incomes (Atkinson 
et al. 2011). In the case of Norway, the break date coincides with banking crisis of 
1988–1992. Note that these break points denote that the underlying trends fitted to 
the data can be described as broken trends, by which we can divide the data into 
regimes and estimate the trends for these different regimes, provided there is suf-
ficient data points within each regime. Where trend breaks could not be found, we 
detect for possible pure level shifts. Out of the remaining 10 data series, we find a 
pure level shift for 9 of them. Interestingly, out of these 9 possible classifications 
based on country and income group, we find 6 of them to show a pure level shift in 
the 1940s. Only the Netherlands does not show any significant trend or level break.
Hypothesis II Is their evidence of top income/wealth shares following a U-shape or 
L-shape trend?
Apart from the Netherlands, all other countries show at least one trend break or 
a pure level shift. Where we find evidence of a trend break, we proceed to estimate 
the broken trends that characterise the historical data chosen in this study. Based on 
where a break, or two break points are located, we partition the sample into sepa-
rate regimes and estimate linear trends for each regime using the robust methods as 
described in the previous section. The trend estimates for pre-break and post-break 
regimes are reported in Table 3. For those countries that exhibit two breaks, we par-
tition the data in to three regimes, whereas for a single break case, the number of 
regimes is two. However, for meaningful estimates to be obtained, a sufficient num-
ber of observations is necessary for estimation of a trend in each regime. We set that 
minimum number to be thirty observations. In some of the cases where break points 
are found to be in the 1980s, the trend estimates for the post break regime may not 
be reported; simply because it is not possible to obtain meaningful estimates, as 
there are too few data points to obtain meaningful results. In the cases where we 
locate pure level shifts, the trend is estimated using first differenced specification.7 
We report the associated 90% and 95% confidence intervals within parentheses 
along with the trend estimates. The results are summarised in Table 3.
The top 0.1 percentile income share for France does show a significant declining 
trend over the period 1915–1982. This period contains two regimes over which the 
trend is found to break; from 1915 to 1948 the trend declined at the rate of 3.6% 
and thereafter until 1982 at the rate of 1.1%. The sharp decline from 1915 to 1948 
reflects the assertion by Piketty that the wars had a huge impact on France with one-
third of capital stock destroyed in World War I and then two-thirds in World War 
II (Piketty 2007, Vol I, p. 56). From 1982 to the end of the sample, that is 2017, 
we find no significant trend. While the estimate of the trend changes sign to being 
positive, the confidence intervals at the 95% and 90% levels contain zero, thereby 
7 The first difference specification is used, as we later on show that these data series contain a unit root.
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Table 3  Robust trend estimation
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Top 0.1% income share
Australia  − 0.0173*
90% conf. interval








Canada Too few observations  − 0.0285***
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0449, − 0.0121) 
95% conf. interval






USA  − 0.0262**
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0443, − 0.0080)
95% conf. interval






France  − 0.0364*
90% conf. interval





(− 0.0171, − 0.0051)
95% conf. interval





















Top 1% income share
Australia  − 0.0170*
90% conf. interval
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Table 3  (continued)
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
USA  − 0.0089***
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0124, − 0.0055)
95% conf. interval


























Sweden  − 0.0169**
90% conf. int
(− 0.0243, − 0.0095)
95% conf. int
(− 0.0256, − 0.0081)





Norway  − 0.0150**
90% conf. int
(− 0.0212, − 0.0088)
95% conf. int
(− 0.0224, − 0.0076)
Too few observations
Netherlands  − 0.0186**
90% conf. int
(− 0.0252, − 0.0120) 95% conf. 
int
(− 0.0264, − 0.0108)
N/A N/A





Too few observations Too few observations
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rendering the estimate to be insignificant. The large variability around this estimated 
trend cannot preclude us from concluding that the estimate is significantly different 
from zero. In the case of Canada, we do not have enough observations to obtain a 
meaningful trend from 1920 to 1933. However, from 1933 to 1971, we find a sig-
nificant negative trend, and thereafter the trend becomes insignificant. A broken 
trend (V-shape) is found for Australia and USA. The decline and subsequent rise in 
top income shares are estimated to be statistically significant. For India, the appar-
ent decline in the trend is insignificant from 1922 to 1977, but then increases at 
the statistically significant rate of 3.4% thereafter. In the case of Japan, we find a 
level shift, a sharp drop in top income shares at 1944, which shows the impact of 
World War II on top income shares, mainly because of a fall in capital income due 
to inflation and war time regulations and destruction (Moriguchi and Saez 2010). 
Table 3  (continued)
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Top 1% wealth share










France  − 0.0072*
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0141, − 0.0003)
95% conf. interval
(− 0.0154, 0.001)
UK  − 0.0089***
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0118, − 0.0059) 95% conf. 
interval
(− 0.0124, − 0.0053)
 − 0.02720***
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0330, − 0.0209)
95% conf. interval
(− 0.0342, − 0.0198)
Too few observations
Top 10% wealth share










France  − 0.0037**
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0063, − 0.0011)
95% conf. interval
(− 0.0068, − 0.0006)
UK  − 0.0028***
90% conf. interval
(− 0.0042, − 0.0014)
95% conf. interval





(− 0.0175, − 0.0095)
Too few observations
*** ,**,and *denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The trend estimates are 
reported with the associated confidence intervals in parentheses
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The overall long-run trend in the top income share for Japan is found to be insig-
nificant; all we find is a precipitous drop due to the war. The lack of any increasing 
or decreasing inequality at least for the first half of the twentieth century suggests 
that the Great Depression did not have much of an impact on Japan (Moriguchi and 
Saez 2010) compared to Australia, USA and France. We find top income shares have 
risen significantly in USA, but no such significant rise is found for Canada since the 
early 1970s.
When considering the top 1% income shares, we continue to find evidence of a 
V-shape trend for Australia and USA. In the case of Australia, the rate of income 
inequality decline for the top 1% is broadly similar to the top 0.1% decline (around 
1.7%). However, the rate of top 1% increase in inequality for Australia is relatively 
slow (1.6%) compared to the top 0.1% income share (2.4%). In the case of top 1% 
income shares of USA, we find a flatter V-shape trend, with both the rate of decline 
and increase being relatively slower. Piketty (2007, p.11) attributes the rise of USA 
top income shares to the very large increases in top wages, especially the salaries 
to top executives. Our results suggest that this faster rate of increase of the rela-
tively very rich (top 0.1%) could be due to the very high compensation of executives 
belonging to this group. Our results depart from the observations made by Atkinson 
and Leigh (2013) of a common U-shaped time path for Anglo-Saxon countries.
In the case of India, comparing 0.1% and 1% top income shares we find the trend 
estimates are very similar across the two regimes. We can conclude the underlying 
factors that may have caused the trend break applies to both the top 0.1% and 1% 
income shares. However, the rate of income inequality increases since the 1970s is 
higher for the top 0.1% income share in comparison with the top 1% income share. 
Canada and France display different dynamics when comparing the top 1% and 
0.1% income shares. We find evidence of trend breaks for the top 0.1%, with two 
trend breaks occurring in the first half and the second half of the twentieth century. 
However, in the case of the top 1% income share we only find a level shift in the 
1940s with both Canada and France showing no significant increase or decrease in 
inequality over the entire sample period. Sweden, Norway and Netherlands show a 
declining trend for most part of the twentieth century. Finland, in comparison with 
its Nordic neighbours, does not show any significant trend. We find four countries 
(Australia, USA, Japan and India) to display similar individual trends when compar-
ing cross the top percentile groups (that is, 0.1% and 1%). When comparing the top 
1% and 10% income shares, only France, displays an insignificant trend. In the case 
of the USA, while the top 0.1% and 1% have a V-shape broken trend, there is no 
significant trend for the top 10% income share. This may be explained by the level 
break that we find for the top 10% income share in the USA. The ‘Great Compres-
sion’ a term due to Goldin and Margo (1992) describes the narrowing of the wage 
gap in the USA after the war in the 1940s.
Our results support the recent study by Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018) 
where they report that there are quite large differences in the level of income, and 
variations in the time trends of income shares, and in the composition of income 
across sources of different earners within the top decile as well as the top percen-
tile group. Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018) point out that this is in contrast to 
past studies that top income earners are similar to each other. While Roine and 
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Shares of Income with Breaks (Top 0.1%)
 Shares of Income with Breaks (Top 1%) 
Shares of Income with Breaks (Top 1%)
Fig. 1  a Shares of income with breaks (Top 0.1%). b Shares of income with breaks (Top 1%). c Shares of 
income with breaks (Top 10%)
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Waldenström (2015) describe inequality in Japan and India to display similar trends 
(p.495), our trend estimates give a very contrasting picture. However, while Atkin-
son et al. (2011) describe most countries (Anglo-Saxon, European, Asian) to record 
a fall in top income shares until around 1980; our results show that we find this to 
be true for only some Anglo-Saxon and European countries, but not for the Asian 
countries. Again, Atkinson et al. (2011) notes Anglo-Saxon countries and India to 
record an increase in top income shares from around 1980. We find partial evidence 
of the top percentile for Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia and USA), but no clear 
evidence for countries such as Canada or New Zealand; however, India shows an 
increasing trend since the late 1970s. In the case of Sweden, we find a negative trend 
from 1920 to 1971, which contrasts with Finland showing an insignificant trend dur-
ing the same period. The trends of the top 0.1%, 1% and 10% income shares for the 
different regimes demarcated by the structural breaks are shown in Fig. 1.
Moving to wealth inequality, we find similar trends for each country when com-
paring the top 1% and 10% wealth shares. For example, in the case of the UK, top 
wealth shares are found to decline in the first half of the twentieth century, after 
which the rate of decline increases until the mid-1980s. Thereafter, while we do 
detect a trend break, there are too few observations to determine a trend from the 
mid-1980s to the end of the sample, that is, 2003. In the case of the USA, we find 
that for both top 1% and 10% shares, there is no trend until the late 1970s and early 
1980s. This absence of trend may be caused by the significant amount of variabil-
ity in wealth concentration, where it peaked before the Great Depression and then 
declined until the point where the trend started to increase again (Kopczuk 2015). 
From the point we detect a trend break for USA, the top shares of wealth inequality 
have been increasing, and the rate of increase of the top 1% exceeds that of the top 
10%. A possible explanation might be the scaling back of the estate tax since the 
1970s in the USA (Kopczuk 2015). Further, this surge in wealth inequality for the 
top 1% as well as the top 10% nests around the period when the USA went through 
financial deregulation. In the case of UK, we find the decline in wealth shares accel-
erating since the 1950s until the 1980s. Possible explanations could be the accu-
mulation of assets by those below the top capital strata, as well as the introduction 
of death duties that may have encouraged wealth owners to distribute their wealth 
thereby creating smaller holdings (Feinstein 1996). The change in trend since 1986 
Shares of Income with Breaks (Top 10%)
Fig. 1  (continued)
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coincides with the financial market reforms or the so called ‘Big Bang’ that took 
place in the UK (Tanndal and Waldenström 2018). Finally, for France we find a 
secular decline and a relatively faster rate (0.72%) of decline for the top 1% wealth 
shares than the estimated decline of 0.37% for the top 10% wealth share. Alvaredo 
et al. (2017) note that the share of inheritance of aggregate private wealth in the UK 
and France was initially high up to 1910, and then gradually fell since then until the 
1980s.
To sum up, we find that almost all countries are characterised by broken trends, 
or level shifts. The preponderance of trend breaks appears in the 1970s and 1980s 
where after a negative trend changes direction to either becoming positive or insig-
nificant, or with too few observations to draw a reasonable conclusion. In the case 
of income shares, a V shape trend seems to appear for Australia and USA for the 
top percentile shares, and a significant positive trend is found since the 1970s for 
these countries as well as India across all income groups of the top percentile. We 
do not find any econometric support for a U-shape trend, but that could be largely 
due to the scarcity of data. Within the top percentile, there is weak evidence of an 
L-shape trend for France, Canada, Sweden and Norway.8 Due to the absence of a 
long continual data for Nordic countries we can only conclude that for most part 
of the twentieth century inequality has been declining though not significantly for 
Finland. Comparing across the top 1% and top 10% wealth shares, the individual 
dynamics are similar for the UK and USA, and France. The trends of the top 1% 
Shares of Wealth with Breaks (Top 1%)
Shares of Wealth with Breaks (Top 10%)
Fig. 2  Shares of Wealth with Breaks (Top 1%). b Shares of wealth with breaks (Top 10%)
8 We note ‘weak’ in the sense that while a downward trend is discernible, the no trend for the remaining 
part of the sample is not estimates Sweden and Norway as too few observations were available for any 
meaningful estimation.
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and 10% wealth shares for the regimes demarcated by structural breaks are shown in 
Fig. 2.
Hypothesis III Do we find evidence of persistent inequality?
Following the results in Table 1, we employ the unit root procedures to test for 
persistence of inequality. We test whether shocks to top income shares are perma-
nent or transitory in nature. Apart for the Netherlands, all other countries with dif-
ferent income share categories contain at least one break in the slope or a pure level 
Table 4  Unit root tests for top income and wealth shares
**denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level
MZa MZt MSB MPT PT
Top 0.1% income share
Australia  − 10.518  − 2.227 0.212 15.779 15.995
Canada  − 9.004  − 2.115 0.235 22.723 22.437
France  − 17.047  − 2.913 0.171 11.176 9.692
India  − 1.903  − 0.726 0.381 47.929 48.804
USA  − 2.729  − 0.882 0.323 48.865 40.329
Japan  − 5.171  − 1.568 0.303 46.18 41.195
Top 1% income share
Australia  − 8.148  − 1.856 0.228 22.37 20.21
Canada  − 3.435  − 1.203 0.35 40.443 40.602
New Zealand  − 12.593  − 2.472 0.196 11.068 9.694
USA  − 23.792**  − 3.439** 0.145** 6.804** 6.546**
Japan  − 8.424  − 2.02 0.24 19.616 19.523
India  − 8.489  − 2.058 0.242 18.516 16.637
Netherlands  − 6.073  − 1.611 0.265 18.59 14.906
France  − 3.88  − 1.256 0.324 44.182 37.85
Sweden  − 6.767  − 1.809 0.267 33.469 30.618
Norway  − 10.837  − 2.327 0.215 11.541 10.896
Finland  − 5.521  − 1.614 0.292 41.396 41.605
Top 10% income shares
USA  − 2.362  − 0.883 0.374 53.848 52.456
France  − 4.115  − 1.296 0.315 42.115 35.945
Top 1% wealth shares
USA  − 6.767  − 1.756 0.26 23.088 23.349
France  − 4.493  − 1.33 0.296 29.493 29.963
UK  − 7.131  − 1.835 0.257 31.115 31.383
Top 10% wealth shares
USA  − 11.25  − 2.371 0.211 15.898 14.495
France  − 6.847  − 1.7 0.248 22.789 21.192
UK  − 7.745  − 1.968 0.254 29.257 27.352
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shift. Accordingly, for Netherlands, the M-class test proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) 
and Ng and Perron (2001) is applied, whereas for all the other countries we perform 
the modified tests proposed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009). The results of the 
tests are reported in Table 4.
The results of the unit root tests show that we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for all the selected countries across all the top income 
and wealth shares with the exception of USA for the top 1% income share. For 
each of the unit root tests we compute the bootstrapped critical values, which 
can be found in Table 5 in Appendix. We carry out a range of tests, that include 




 , and in 
each case (apart for the top 1% income share of the USA) we find the estimated 
test statistic to be insignificant to reject the unit root null. The results imply that 
shocks to top income shares are not transitory in nature. Our results lend support 
to the conclusions of persistence made by Christopoulos and McAdam (2017).
5  Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature on the long-run evolution of top income shares 
by testing three hypotheses. First, we test for structural breaks in the series using 
robust methods that allow us to be agnostic about the order of integration of 
the data series. Secondly, using the using robust methods we fit linear trends to 
regimes demarcated by structural breaks; that is, we estimate the trends in the 
inequality series for the pre-break and/or inter-break, and post-break regimes. 
Finally, we test for persistence, that is, whether shocks to inequality are tran-
sitory or not, allowing for the symmetric treatment of structural breaks in the 
inequality series. Through testing these hypotheses, we obtain the dynamics of 
the top income and wealth shares for a reasonably long period of time, at least 
using almost a century of continuous time series data.
The structural break tests are insightful as they show a preponderance of 
trend breaks around the 1970s and 1980s for the top percentile income share. 
This coincides with many countries adopting a fiscal policy of tax cuts albeit to 
varying degrees, as well as a surge in wage incomes. This is true for USA, Aus-
tralia, and India for the top percentile income shares. In the case of Japan we 
find level shifts around the mid-1940s, thereby realising the immediate impact 
that was felt in the aftermath of World War II for the top 0.1% as well as the top 
1%. The same impact was felt by the top 10% in USA and France.
It has been argued that technology shifts that are skills biased can change the 
trend of inequality. We see some evidence of this, that there is a change in the 
trend for Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia and USA, and the arresting 
of a negative trend for France. Other European countries may have followed a 
similar path to France, such as Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, but there 
are too few observations following the location of the trend break to make a 
meaningful inference. However, we can say that in general there is a change in 
the underlying negative trend, prevalent for a large part of the twentieth century 
around the 1970s and 1980s. While we cannot be definitive whether the trend 
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in recent years is significantly positive or not for all countries, we are reason-
able sure that there has been a change in trend from around the early 1980s. 
A possible explanation for this finding might be the view expressed that the 
introduction of assembly lines may have caused a decrease in inequality while 
the ICT revolution led to an increase in inequality, or an arrest to the decline in 
inequality. The timing however, may be different, longer in countries such as 
New Zealand and Netherlands, in comparison with Sweden and Finland, which 
is not completely unexpected as technological changes do not take place at the 
same time around the world due to adoption lags (Comin and Mestieri 2013). 
Besides our results show that skill-biased technology alone cannot explain the 
diverging patterns in the high-income countries; rather institutional factors and 
policy differences may have played a part (Alvaredo et al. 2013). The financial 
deregulation and privatisation that occurred in the USA and UK coincide with 
the break in the trend found for the top wealth shares in those countries. This 
result suggests that the growth of the financial sector during this time may have 
contributed to the change in the trend of wealth inequality, which had not been 
increasing over time prior to the 1980s. In general, the time path of top income 
and wealth shares are different for individual countries, and cannot be aggre-
gated in to groups such as Anglo-Saxon or Nordic or Asian, as countries within 
such a group do not exhibit common dynamics.
Finally, a test is carried out on how persistent shocks are to the top income 
shares. We find that using unit root tests that allow for structural breaks the 
conclusion is clearly in favour of inequality being highly persistent to shocks. 
This view is contrary to that of Islam and Madsen (2015) but supports the con-
clusions of Christopoulos and McAdam (2017). If regression based analysis on 
long-run top income or wealth share data is to be carried out, then the coun-
try specific characteristics may need to be accounted for given the possibility 
of structural breaks and the underlying persistence that are found to exist in 
the data. One could argue that the major shocks such as the World Wars and 
the Great Depression had a persistent effect on income inequality, since the 
high taxes had a persistent effect on capital owners, affecting their wealth and 
income. Holter (2015) documents several reasons why persistence may exist in 
top income shares, which include the returns to investment in human capital, 
progressive taxation, and the presence of credit constraints. The finding of per-
sistent inequality can have consequences for distributional mobility and there 
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Table 5  Unit root tests critical values





Top 0.1 income share
Australia 10  − 20.071  − 3.136 0.157 7.847 7.847
5  − 23.579  − 3.41 0.145 6.57 6.57
1  − 32.19  − 3.977 0.125 4.654 4.654
Canada 10  − 24.449  − 3.462 0.141 8.6 8.6
5  − 28.511  − 3.751 0.131 7.253 7.253
1  − 37.196  − 4.292 0.115 5.44 5.44
France 10  − 20.432  − 3.171 0.154 8.29 8.29
5  − 24.014  − 3.447 0.142 6.948 6.948
1  − 32.098  − 3.983 0.124 5.008 5.008
India 10  − 19.48  − 3.096 0.16 7.377 7.377
5  − 23.131  − 3.378 0.148 6.186 6.186
1  − 31.537  − 3.93 0.127 4.424 4.424
United States 10  − 18.491  − 3.029 0.159 8.611 8.611
5  − 22.118  − 3.324 0.145 7.213 7.213
1  − 28.969  − 3.819 0.127 5.179 5.179
Japan 10  − 24.952  − 3.509 0.14 9.016 9.016
5  − 28.955  − 3.785 0.13 7.711 7.711
1  − 37.423  − 4.312 0.115 5.85 5.85
Top 1 income share
Australia 10  − 19.297  − 3.086 0.158 8.845 8.845
5  − 23.005  − 3.386 0.144 7.338 7.338
1  − 28.167  − 3.788 0.128 5.537 5.537
Canada 10  − 19.988  − 3.137 0.157 7.875 7.875
5  − 23.615  − 3.416 0.145 6.604 6.604
1  − 31.831  − 3.958 0.125 4.771 4.771
France 10  − 20.41  − 3.169 0.155 8.264 8.264
5  − 23.985  − 3.444 0.143 6.925 6.925
1  − 32.107  − 3.983 0.124 4.983 4.983
India 10  − 19.14  − 3.071 0.161 7.556 7.556
5  − 22.801  − 3.359 0.148 6.31 6.31
1  − 30.344  − 3.873 0.128 4.566 4.566
United States 10  − 19.065  − 3.067 0.16 8.307 8.307
5  − 22.744  − 3.364 0.146 6.897 6.897
1  − 28.661  − 3.803 0.128 5.135 5.135
Japan 10  − 17.506  − 2.944 0.165 9.588 9.588
5  − 21.153  − 3.262 0.147 7.833 7.833
1  − 23.307  − 3.548 0.133 6.078 6.078
New Zealand 10  − 19.6  − 3.073 0.163 6.252 6.252
5  − 22.996  − 3.331 0.152 5.236 5.236
1  − 34  − 4.021 0.127 3.474 3.474
Netherlands 10  − 14  − 2.607 0.186 6.78 6.78
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Table 5  (continued)





5  − 17.326  − 2.896 0.168 5.544 5.544
1  − 24.485  − 3.471 0.142 3.833 3.833
Finland 10  − 25.975  − 3.588 0.138 9.145 9.145
5  − 29.952  − 3.851 0.129 7.884 7.884
1  − 38.434  − 4.366 0.114 5.965 5.965
Norway 10  − 16.793  − 2.887 0.172 7.174 7.174
5  − 20.334  − 3.181 0.156 5.94 5.94
1  − 27.39  − 3.7 0.134 4.2 4.2
Sweden 10  − 24.557  − 3.495 0.142 8.592 8.592
5  − 28.445  − 3.763 0.132 7.34 7.34
1  − 36.996  − 4.292 0.116 5.492 5.492
Top 10 income share
France 10  − 20.41  − 3.169 0.155 8.264 8.264
5  − 23.985  − 3.444 0.143 6.925 6.925
1  − 32.107  − 3.983 0.124 4.983 4.983
United States 10  − 19.112  − 3.072 0.159 8.842 8.842
5  − 22.815  − 3.373 0.145 7.324 7.324
1  − 27.73  − 3.766 0.128 5.537 5.537
Top 1 wealth share
United States 10  − 20.369  − 3.165 0.155 8.124 8.124
5  − 23.951  − 3.441 0.143 6.811 6.811
1  − 32.237  − 3.986 0.124 4.906 4.906
France 10  − 19.541  − 3.103 0.159 7.806 7.806
5  − 23.203  − 3.389 0.146 6.529 6.529
1  − 30.822  − 3.904 0.127 4.748 4.748
United Kingdom 10  − 24.875  − 3.52 0.14 9.192 9.192
5  − 29.094  − 3.805 0.129 7.914 7.914
1  − 36.882  − 4.287 0.115 5.983 5.983
Top 10 wealth share
United States 10  − 18.557  − 3.027 0.161 9.027 9.027
5  − 22.242  − 3.334 0.146 7.437 7.437
1  − 26.192  − 3.689 0.13 5.675 5.675
France 10  − 19.583  − 3.106 0.159 7.787 7.787
5  − 23.243  − 3.391 0.146 6.517 6.517
1  − 30.969  − 3.911 0.127 4.732 4.732
United Kingdom 10  − 24.076  − 3.463 0.143 8.819 8.819
5  − 28.108  − 3.744 0.133 7.534 7.534
1  − 36.219  − 4.252 0.117 5.642 5.642
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